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Rule of Law Symposium
Strengthening Demand for the Rule of Law
in Post-Conflict Societies
Jane Stromseth*
Building the rule of law in the wake of military conflict has
proven to be a complex and formidable challenge in countries as
diverse as Iraq, Afghanistan, Timor-Leste, and Sierra Leone. It
has become clear in these and other situations that
strengthening the rule of law is not simply a matter of building
institutions-courts, legislatures, and so forth-or enacting
better laws. The rule of law also depends crucially on building
public trust and confidence in those institutions. Or, to put it
another way, strengthening the rule of law is not only a
question of the supply side of institutions, but also depends
crucially on the demand side: addressing the needs and
aspirations of ordinary people, reaching out to them, giving
them a stake in the law, and helping to create institutions that
are responsive to their concerns and worthy of their trust and
confidence.
The specific challenges of building public trust and
confidence in-and demand for-the rule of law in difficult postconflict situations is one of many challenges that my colleagues
Dean David Wippman, Professor Rosa Brooks, and I address in
our book, Can Might Make Rights?: Building the Rule of Law
After Military Interventions.' I will say a few words here about
why we picked that particular topic for the book. Then I will
* Jane Stromseth, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. This
article is adapted from Professor Stromseth's remarks at the Minnesota Journal of
International Law's Rule of Law Symposium on November 14, 2008.
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share some of the results of our research-both the good news
and the bad news about the challenges of post-conflict rule of
law building. I'll highlight, in particular, some of the special
issues on the demand side of rule of law reform.
Each of my co-authors and I were serving in government in
the late 1990s. David Wippman and I were at the White House
at the National Security Council; Rosa Brooks was at the State
Department. We were involved in some aspects of the
interventions in Timor-Leste and in Kosovo, and the
reconstruction efforts in Sierra Leone, Bosnia, and Haiti. As we
went back to our respective positions as law professors, we were
thinking about writing a book looking at the legality and
legitimacy of these interventions (after all, we are lawyers); but
we also wanted to look at their effectiveness. Had these
interventions actually made the people in those societies better
off in the aftermath of the international interventions? As we
thought about this question it became clear to us that building
the rule of law was really the centerpiece in any sustainable
effort to help make people in a society that was the target of an
intervention ultimately better off.
Then the attacks of September 11 shook the world and led
to interventions triggered and motivated primarily by national
security concerns. We started to wonder about the continued
relevance of our book project focused largely on humanitarian
intervention. Yet as we looked at the intervention in Iraq,
whatever one might think about it, and the intervention in
Afghanistan, we saw that many of the same problems and
challenges arose in their wake: the challenge of building
inclusive and credible governance structures, of building fair
and effective judicial systems, of enacting laws that are
responsive to the needs of the population, and so forth. It struck
us that many common issues arise regardless of the motivation
that may lead an intervener to act. So we began looking at the
multiple challenges of building the rule of law in the aftermath
of intervention.
In our research, we uncovered both some bad news and
some good, more hopeful, news as we traveled to the Balkans,
Timor-Leste, Sierra Leone, Iraq, and a number of other
countries.
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THE BAD NEWS: RECURRING PROBLEMS IN POSTCONFLICT RULE OF LAW BUILDING
Let's start with the bad news. Why have past efforts to
build the rule of law not been nearly as effective in most postconflict settings as any of us would like? There are many
reasons that are, of course, highly specific to particular
countries that have to do with the particular history, culture,
and, above all, the leadership in those countries. Not every postconflict society has a Nelson Mandela or a Jose Ramos-Horta
that they can turn to for inspiration, to bring out the best in
people.
We found, however, that there are three overarching
reasons why efforts to strengthen the rule of law after
intervention often falls short-reasons that tend to recur in
different societies. First is the inherent difficulty of
strengthening the rule of law in societies that have been
devastated by conflict-in circumstances where legal and
political institutions are deeply distrusted, where the
infrastructure is devastated, and where people are often deeply
pessimistic about the possibilities of the law being fair or helpful
in their lives. It is enormously hard to build not only the
institutions but also the cultural acceptance and confidence and
commitment to the rule of law that is so important.
In addition, interveners themselves complicate the story if
their intervention is regarded as suspect, as not legitimate, by
large segments of the local population, or if their own conduct
undermines the message that law matters. For example, see
Abu Ghraib. It is hard to convince people to take rule of law
norms seriously if the intervener's conduct is undermining the
very message that it is trying to send. Interveners also often do
not have a good understanding of local culture, traditions, or
language. Often interveners will need to deploy anthropologists
as well as lawyers and other country experts if they are
genuinely trying to tackle the deeper problems of building the
rule of law.
To complicate matters further, difficult challenges and
tradeoffs accompany any effort to build the rule of law after
conflict. Short term interests may genuinely conflict with longterm interests. For example, accommodations with local war
lords in Afghanistan may give you some initial stability in rural
areas, but this can also entrench and empower spoilers who will
end up undermining and compromising efforts to move in a
more democratic direction. Fostering local ownership and
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respecting local cultural norms may involve working with local
tribal justice systems, which may enjoy considerable local
legitimacy, but they may conflict fundamentally with
international human rights norms, particularly the human
rights of women. These are all illustrations of how enormously
complicated the task of trying to strengthen the rule of law in
the aftermath of conflict is, especially for external interveners.
A second reason why these efforts have so often fallen short
is that they tend to focus on formal institutions-on the
structures, on the means, enacting legal codes, training judges,
building courthouses. All of this is important and necessary,
but there is often too little attention given to the underlying
challenge of nurturing a culture that believes in and values the
rule of law or in making institutional reforms that are really
responsive to meeting the needs of the people.
We tell a story in our book that illustrates this. We call it
the camel story. It's probably apocryphal, but let me just briefly
tell it here. During the 19th and early 20th centuries, some
Middle Eastern governments were eager to improve the lot of
nomadic tribes people, who roamed from place to place, living in
tents, without reliable access to clean water or health care or
schools. The governments thought: "Let's build houses for the
nomads. We'll give them to the nomads for free, they'll settle
down, become townspeople, and they'll have all these things we
regard as part of modern life." So, the officials built the houses
and the nomads came, scratched their heads and decided to
keep living in their tents (which they preferred to the new
houses). The nomads pitched their tents outside the houses, and
they put their camels in the new houses, which soon
deteriorated because they really were not built with the needs of
camels in mind. After a while, the nomads decided to carry on,
they uprooted their tents and they went off, leaving government
officials scratching their heads at this unsuccessful effort at
transformation.
Well-intentioned efforts by external interveners to build the
rule of law in post-conflict societies by creating new formal
structures and laws can run into similar problems. Interveners
may think that the mantra "if we build it, they will come"
applies to courts as well as baseball fields. But courts do not
occupy the same place in every culture. In many societies there
may be tribal justice systems, there may be other ways of
resolving disputes, and these new institutions that are built
may not be the most responsive to the particular needs of the
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people in that society. There is a challenge in many rule of law
programs to address more effectively needs that are directly felt
as coming from the people themselves.
A third and related reason why post-conflict rule of law
building efforts have often fallen short is their segmentation.
Different agencies focus on different aspects of the rule of law.
You have people who train judges, people who design criminal
law codes, people who focus on building better prisons. But,
often there is not enough of an attempt to look at the
interrelationships between these different reform efforts. If
there isn't an effort to look at the interconnections, reform
programs often will have only piecemeal results. They may
actually empower local actors in ways that make them
unaccountable and undermine the long-term goal of building the
rule of law.
Let me give an example from Haiti. In Haiti there was an
enormous effort during the mid-1990s to reform and strengthen
the police system, which had been very corrupt and very
problematic. There was quite a bit of progress made initially in
training and recruiting and building a better police force. But
not quite as much effort went into judicial reform. What ended
up happening was that these newly trained police arrested a lot
of people, many of whom were detained for months, some for
years, without a judicial system able to adequately process their
cases and give them due process. Judges in the meantime could
be bribed to release suspects. The broader concerns of the public
that the law was not really there to protect them, but was
rather an instrument of repression and control, were not
adequately addressed. So although there was enormous
progress on one dimension of the rule of law, it was not balanced
by related reforms.
These problems of the inherent challenges, of the lack of
attention to underlying cultural dimensions, and of the
segmentation of rule of law reforms have been recurring
problems in many different post-conflict societies.
THE HOPEFUL NEWS
But what about the good news? (We're Minnesotans, we like
good news!) We now have a clearer sense of some of the things
that need to be done better. Many of the earlier speakers in this
symposium mentioned those things. We have a much better
sense now-those of us working on rule of law issues, people
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working at the U.N., people working at government agencies,
NGOs, local reformers-that there is no "one size fits all"
template. There is no such thing as "rule of law in a box" that
you can simply drop down on a society. Building the rule of law
is something that has to grow from the culture, the history, and
that draws on local aspirations and goals. To enjoy legitimacy it
must be built with the support and leadership of the local
population.
We also understand the important need to establish basic
security early on, right away in the aftermath of intervention,
because if there is looting and rioting and spiraling down of
security you don't have the foundation to build the rule of law.
Once you lose that momentum, it is very hard to get it back.
We also have a sense of the need to coordinate rule of law
efforts with economic reforms and other kinds of initiatives as
part of a holistic approach to post-conflict rule of law building.
Increasingly, we are also beginning to see greater
appreciation of the importance of building on the demand sidestrengthening public understanding of and support for the rule
of law-and being adaptive and creative and sensitive to the
culture in doing this. We have a whole chapter in our book
called "creating rule of law cultures." It is a bit of a
presumptuous title because in fact interveners usually do not
understand local cultures very well. And none of us know as
much as we might want about how to nurture cultural change
over time. It is particularly difficult in a post-conflict society
where people are deeply distrustful of governmental and legal
institutions, for good reason, based on bitter past experience.
Successfully fostering a rule of law culture, and giving people
legitimate reasons to have confidence in the rule of law, can
take years and is very challenging and complicated.
Let me give a few examples of some important things that
can be done better by interveners working with local reformers
in this regard. One is to examine carefully the role that formal
legal institutions such as courts actually play in a particular
society in the first place. To what extent does the society rely on
other dispute resolution mechanisms? Are those mechanisms
regarded as legitimate? Do they discriminate against some
segments of the society? A careful look at the terrain,
understanding the range of dispute resolution mechanisms in
effect, and how they might be nurtured in a progressive
direction is an important initial step.
Reformers also need to get to the grassroots to find ways to
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reach beyond cities and elites and reach out to people in remote
areas. Let me give one example of this in Sierra Leone. A
number of Western NGOs have helped train local paralegals in
Sierra Leone who work in the countryside and go out and
educate people about their rights and about the alternative
modes of dispute resolution that are available to them. So they
might say to a young woman that there is a tribal elder system
you can go to, but there also are courts in the city some miles
away. The paralegals give people a sense of their options and
alternatives. By empowering people to know about their
alternatives, not only does this give them more choices, but also
it puts a certain amount of creative pressure on the traditional
dispute settlement system because all of sudden the tribal chiefs
know that they are in competition for market share in dispute
resolution. Maybe they need to offer a higher quality of justice if
they want a continued flow of business. So that is an example of
an innovative program that has gotten out to the grassroots and
has helped nurture important aspects of the rule of law.
Another crucial dimension on the demand side is to
strengthen civil society organizations, including local NGOs that
can monitor domestic justice systems and make sure they are
actually providing some degree of fair justice to the local
population. An example of this is the Judicial System
Monitoring Program in Timor-Leste.'
This is a valuable
organization supported by a number of governments and NGOs.
The Judicial System Monitoring Program not only monitors
trials and proceedings in the judicial system in Timor-Leste; it
also has a women's justice unit, which looks at the impact on
women of the proceedings before various courts. In addition, it
has a victims' rights unit that focuses particularly on domestic
violence, a big problem, and tries to assist women looking for
some degree of protection when they face domestic violence.
That's an example of a critical initiative that is trying to
strengthen the rule of law by focusing not only on the
institutional supply side but also on the public demand side of
the equation.
the
importance
of including
We also emphasize
marginalized groups, of trying to give people a greater stake in
the law and greater knowledge about their rights. Reaching out
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to the public creatively, using music, drama, and the arts, can
be especially effective in connecting to young people. One
innovative organization that is using such creative methods to
educate people about the rule of law is Interactive Radio for
Justice.' This organization is currently working in the eastern
Congo, where things are very bleak. In fact, it is only able to
work through radio because the security situation is so difficult.
The organization is helping to educate people about their rights
in a number of ways. For example, as the organization's leader
Wanda Hall recently explained at a talk in Washington, DC, in
part of eastern Congo, the police had a tendency to stop people
and essentially demand a payment from them, accusing them of
violating a law that said people had to stop and salute the flag
whenever the flag was visible. Well, it turned out that police
were stopping people and fining them even when the flag was
nowhere to be seen. People were very traumatized by this and
were the victims of extortion. This Radio Justice show
interviewed local officials who acknowledged publicly on the
radio that the law requires that the flag be in clear view for this
penalty to be in effect and also that people must be given a
ticket that provides for a clear fine of a designated amount.
Well, all of sudden people understood that there was a law that
had some limitations, so if they were confronted with this
situation, they could say to the police, "no, the law doesn't say
that, you can't just stop me and take money away from me." It
turns out that this public awareness of the law has actually
gone some way to address the problem. That is an example of
work on the demand side that is a crucial component of trying to
build the rule of law.
The outreach program of Sierra Leone's Special Court
provides another example of an innovative effort to strengthen
domestic awareness of, and capacity for, the rule of law. The
Special Court's primary function is to bring to justice those who
bear the greatest responsibility for the brutal atrocities that
marked Sierra Leone's violent civil war. As a hybrid war crimes
tribunal, the Special Court includes both international and
Sierra Leonean judges, prosecutors, investigators, defense
attorneys, administrators, and other staff. Though not without
its challenges, the Special Court is contributing in some tangible
ways to Sierra Leone's domestic legal system. For example,
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Sierra Leonean police investigators working with the Special
Court have gained some valuable training in witness protection
and management. Beyond these supply-side contributions to
the domestic justice system, the Special Court's outreach office
is engaged in important demand-side capacity-building:
educating the public about the Court's work and about the
importance of legal accountability and fair justice through town
hall meetings and lively discussions throughout the country.4
The outreach office also helped create "Accountability Now
Clubs" at local universities-clubs of university students that
consider issues of justice, accountability, human rights and good
governance in Sierra Leone. In addition, the Court has engaged
and empowered civil society organizations through the Special
Court Interactive Forum, a gathering of local and international
NGOs that focus primarily on the Court's work and how it can
be improved, but that also network on related issues of
This sort of domestic
accountability and human rights.
capacity-building can nurture a greater ability within civil
society to insist upon justice and accountability from developing
domestic legal and political institutions.
All this is not to neglect the importance of strengthening
the ability of post-conflict states to actually supply fair and
credible justice. On the contrary, building public demand for
justice must be combined with sustained efforts to build state
legal capacity to provide fair justice through strengthened
institutions-courts, police, legislatures, and so forth-that are
credible and enjoy public legitimacy. Otherwise, public
expectations and hopes for the rule of law will be raised only to
be dashed.
CONCLUSION
In the wake of armed conflict, building the rule of law is
critically important yet enormously hard. Mutually reinforcing
reforms usually will be needed in multiple areas-from security,
to governance, to justice system reform, to accountability for
atrocities, among other reforms. Strengthening cultural,
political, and institutional foundations for the rule of law, and
building public confidence in the very idea of the rule of law, all

4. For a fuller discussion of the Special Court's outreach efforts, see Jane
Stromseth, Pursuing Accountability for Atrocities After Conflict: What Impact on
Building the Rule of Law?, 38 GEO. J. INT'L L. 251, 304-308 (2007).
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are a crucial part of the mix.
In the face of such daunting challenges, interveners need to
be both more humble and more ambitious as they work on rule
of law programs in post-conflict settings. They need to be more
humble in recognizing that their own role as interveners is
limited and partial and that they are not the experts on the local
culture; the local people are. They also need to be more
ambitious in working holistically and creatively on a wide array
of rule of law initiatives such as the ones described above, giving
closer attention to issues of public education and confidence, and
not taking an overly narrow supply-side view of the rule of law.

